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NOTE
BLIND IMITATION OF THE PAST:
AN ANALYSIS OF PECUNIARY DAMAGES
IN WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of
law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry
IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which
it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule
simply persists from blind imitation of the past.
Oliver Wendell Holmes*

C OLORADO

INTRODUCTION

presently adheres to the "pecuniary loss" doctrine in wrongful death cases. Under this doctrine, the plaintiff is entitled to recover only for the economic loss he has suffered as a result of the death. Neither mental anguish nor loss
of companionship, guidance, or consortium is, under this rule,
a compensable injury. The history of the pecuniary loss rule is
a peculiar one. Since Anglo-Saxon times it has taken curious
twists, sometimes for good reasons, but all too frequently for
bad ones. As a result of this anomaly, policies which became
antiquated a hundred years ago still control the Colorado courts.
This note will (1) examine the historical development of the
pecuniary loss rule; (2) analyze the policies on which it is based,
comparing them with current social policies; (3) examine the
ways in which modern courts have dealt with the question;
and (4) suggest an avenue of reform.
I. THE HISIoicAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PECUNIARY Loss RULE
A. The English Background
1. The Common Law Heritage
In the landmark case of Baker v. Bolton1 Lord Ellenborough
laid down the basic common law rule that absent a statute no
action will lie for wrongful death.2 The origin of the rule in
Baker dates back to the middle ages where a civil action for
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
1 1 Campbell 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (C.P. 1808).

2 This rule has been criticized for 150 years. See, e.g., Hay, Death as a
Civil Cause of Action in Massachusetts, 7 HARV. L. REV. 170 (1893);
Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 L.Q. REV. 431
(1916); Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1043
(1965); Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases of the Common Law Rules,
13 VAND. L. REV. 605 (1960).
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wrongful death was, under the doctrine of merger,8 superseded
by the criminal action of homicide, which belonged to the
crown. 4 Notwithstanding the doctrine of merger, however, the
clan of a person wrongfully killed was entitled to a payment
("wer"), the amount of which depended on the social status
of the deceased.5
Thus, at common law, the wer served as compensation to
the deceased's family. By 1808, however, this doctrine was virtually extinct. Instead, English law had devised another form
of compensation known as appeal. By this means a convicted
felon could secure a release from criminal liability from the
plaintiff, who in certain cases was very generously rewarded.,
However, in 1819 this remedy was also abolished,7 and England
was left with only half a policy; the rule in Baker still applied
to thwart any wrongful death actions, but the compensation
which the criminal law provided and which was implicit in the
Baker rationale no longer existed.
At this point in history, the very nature of wrongful death
changed. Prior to the 19th century the typical defendant in a
wrongful death action would have been a felon- most likely
a highwayman or burglar. Such a person, if apprehended,
usually went to prison and, consequently, it was appropriate
that the matter should be within the purview of the criminal
law." With the advent of the industrial revolution, the typical
defendant was no longer a felon, but a railroad or factory. The
wrong was not malicious, but merely negligent.
Then suddenly at mid-century society faced up in a panic to a
virtually new phenomenon- accidental death through corporate
enterprise. Tragedy as a result of indifference and neglect was
suddenly upon us in the factory, or the city streets, and on the
rails. Nor was the principal villain of the piece any longer the
impecunious felon. In his place stood the prospering corporation
with abundant assets to meet the needs of widows and orphans. 9

Perhaps in response to this change 0 Parliament in 1846
passed the "Fatal Accidents Act," more commonly known as
Holdsworth, supra note 2.
Higgins v. Butcher, Yelv. 89, 80 Eng. Rep. 61 (K.B. 1607).
5 Malone, supra note 2, at 1055. See generally 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 448-62 (2d ed. 1968).
"Hay, supra note 2, at 172-73.
7 An Act to Abolish Appeals of Murder, Treason, Felony cr Other Offences, and Wager of Battel, or joining Issue and Trial by Battel, in
Writs of Right, 59 GEO. 3, c. 46 (1819).
8 Hay, supra note 2, at 176.
Malone, supra note 2.
10 15 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF' ENGLISH LAW 220 (1965).
3
4
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Lord Campbell's Act. 1' The Act provided that in all cases in
which the deceased, had he lived, would have had a cause of
action against the tort-feasor, certain named beneficiaries could
sue in their own name and be awarded such damages as the
jury felt were "proportioned to Injury resulting from such
Death."12
2. Blake v. Midland Railway Co.
At first glance, the provision for damages in Lord Campbell's Act would seem to give the jury almost unlimited discretion in assessing the measure of damages in a wrongful death
action. Judicial construction, however, quickly restricted the
jury's latitude. The key decision in this regard is Blake v. Midland Railway Co.13 in which it was held that damages should
be limited to the pecuniary loss suffered by the plaintiff. The
importance of this rule cannot be underestimated. It serves as
the basis for the entire law of damages in wrongful death actions, not only in England, but in most American jurisdictions
as well. Nevertheless, close inspection reveals that Blake was
based on highly suspect reasoning.
The facts in Blake were simple. The deceased was killed in
a train crash and his wife sued, basing her claim upon Lord
Campbell's Act. Liability was confessed, and the only issue became one of damages. At the trial, the judge instructed the
jury that:
[H]e thought there was great difficulty in fixing any measure but
that of pecuniary injury: but that, if they considered the plaintiff entitled to any compensation for bereavement she had sustained, beyond the pecuniary loss, they were to make their esti14
mates accordingly.

This broad instruction was the basis of the reversal; yet
there were excellent reasons for upholding it. First, the concept of solatium was not new. It was well recognized as a
legitimate item of damages for wrongful death in Scotland.
Indeed, as plaintiff's attorney pointed out, Lord Campbell himself, while still a practicing attorney, had observed that:
Although, by the English law, if a man's wife or son were killed
by negligence, he could have no action, because "the English law
allows no solatium in this respect," "the Scotch law" "says more
11 Act for Compensating the Families of Persons Killed by Accidents, 9 &
10 Vict., c. 93 (1846).
12Id. The act also stated that the beneficiaries could sue regardless of
whether the tort-feasor's act was also felonious. Thus, the merger doctrine, which had been so important in the Baker case would not be a
factor in any construction of the Act.
13 18 Q.B. 93, 118 Eng. Rep. 5 (1852).
14 Id. at 96-97, 118 Eng. Rep. at 36.
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sensibly that in such a case a solatium shall be granted to the
person injured in his happiness and circumstance by the death of
his wife or child."' 1 5

Moreover, solatium was also recognized as a proper item of
damages in normal trespass actions.
In refusing to grant this item of damages to a decedant's
survivors, Lord Coleridge drew a distinction between wrongful
death and personal injury and pointed out that "[w]hen an
action is brought by an individual for a personal wrong, the
jury, in assessing the damages, can with little difficulty award
him a solatium for his mental suffering alone, with an indemnity for his pecuniary loss. ' '16 To argue that juries have an easier time computing solatium for people who survive than for the
relatives of the people who die, seems unjustifiable. Solatium,
pain, and anguish are all elements of damages which different
juries have responded to in very different ways. It is precisely
because juries on occasion have brought in rather huge awards
based on these hard-to-prove categories that good defense attorneys are at such a premium. In fact, juries will bring back
huge awards because it seems just, not because they had an
easy time computing the dollar value of an injured plaintiff's
emotional injuries.
The main thrust of Coleridge's opinion, however, is aimed
at the unfair burden a broad rule of damages would place on
businesses. He stated: "We must recollect that the Act we
are construing applies not only to great Railway Companies but
to little tradesmen who send out a cart and horse in the care
of an apprentice." 17 This facet of the rationale, however, seems
to have been based more on empathy than sound logic. The
courts had found no need to protect the small businessman
whose negligence merely maimed a victim. In such cases, as we
have seen, solatium was a legitimate item of damages. Why then
protect him when his actions wrongfully caused a death? If
anything, the rules should be reversed. Not only is killing
someone a more serious injury than maiming him, but it happens less frequently. Thus if the courts were serious about
protecting businesses from solatium damages, they would protect them in the nondeath cases first.

15

Id. at 100, 118 Eng. Rep. at 38. This quote is taken from the clerk's
record of the argument and represents the plaintiff's attorney's statement of Lord Campbell's argument in Duncan v. Findlater, 6 Cl. & Fin.

894, 7 Eng. Rep. 934 (1839).

16 18 Q.B. 93, 111, 118 Eng. Rep. 35, 41-42 (1852).

17 Id. at 111, 118 Eng. Rep. at 42.
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In part, the oral argument in Blake was addressed to the
intent of Parliament when it passed the statute. I8 As Lord
Campbell, the Act's author, was himself one of the judges hearing the case, the court was in an unusually good position to
determine the intent of the legislature. Lord Campbell's actions
in the case remain, however, a mystery. He took an active part
in the oral argument, constantly interrupting the attorney for
the railroad, in one instance resolving a point in favor of the
plaintiff.19 His own bias, one would assume based on his comment about the Scottish law and his authorship of the Act
itself, may well have favored extended liability. Nevertheless,
he not only failed to write an opinion in the case, he was not
present when the opinion was issued. 20 Consequently, one can
only speculate as to his influence in the decision. However,
there is some evidence that it was minimal. Lord Campbell
himself does not appear to have attached much importance to
his wrongful death act. In fact, in his autobiography he not
only fails to mention the "Fatal Accidents Act" but said: "I
did not take any very prominent part in the business of the
session of 1846. ' ' 21 Additionally, the week that the decision in
Blake was handed down, a new government was being formed.
From Lord Campbell's Journal, it seems that politics, not law,
was paramount in his mind. 22 The point of this digression is that
Lord Campbell's presence on the court which rendered the
decision does not necessarily mean that Justice Coleridge's
opinion accurately reflects the intent of Parliament when it
passed the Act.
B. From England to Colorado
In the beginning it appeared that American courts would
not fall into the same historical tangle as the English courts.
In fact, for the first half of the 19th century, American courts
rejected the rule that at common law wrongful death could not
be considered a legal injury. 23 However, in 1848, the decision
in Carey v. Berkshire Railroad Co. 24 began a trend in the United
States of adopting the rule in Baker v. Bolton.25 In response,
18

Id. at 104, 118 Eng. Rep. at 39.

19
Id. at 106, 118. Eng. Rep. at 40.
2
0 Id.at

108, 118 Eng. Rep. at 40.

2111 HARDCASTLE, LIFE OF LORD CAMPBELL 199 (1881).
22
23

Id.

Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90, (Conn. 1794), Ford v. Monroe, 20 Wend. 210
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838); Plummer v. Webb, 19 F. Cas. 894 (No. 11234)
(C. Mo. 1825) (dictum). See also, F. TIFFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL
ACT

25

(2d ed. 1913); Malone, supra note 2, at 1066.

Mass. (1 Cush.) 475 (1848).
F. TIFFANY, supra note 23; Malone, supra note 2.

2455
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American jurisdictions began to pass wrongful death statutes,
26
most of them modeled after Lord Campbell's Act.
Colorado originally passed such a statute in 187227 and 5
years later modified and re-enacted the statute.28 Except for
modifications as to the maximum amount of damages permissible, this statute is the same as Colorado's present wrongful
death statute, 29 which, in defining the measure of damages,
provides:
[T]he jury may give such damages as they may deem fair and
just, not to exceed forty-five thousand dollars, with reference
to the necessary injury resulting from such death, to the surviv30
ing partner, who may be entitled to sue.

In 1874, the Colorado Supreme Court, obviously basing its
opinion on Blake3l adopted the pecuniary loss rule of compensatory damages.32 Speaking for the majority, Justice Belford
stated:
It seems to me, therefore, that the survivors are not entitled to
compensation for such anguish as they may have endured by reason of the taking of the parent ....

Whatever is susceptible of

pecuniary compensation enters into the rule, and what can not be
33
included must be left out.

In 1894 the Court affirmed this rule and stated the rule
of damages in wrongful death actions which has gone basically
unchanged since then:
The true measure of compensatory relief in an action of this kind,
under the act of 1877, supra, is a sum equal to the net pecuniary
benefit which plaintiff might reascnably have expected to receive
from the deceased in case his life had not been terminated by
the wrongful act, neglect or default of the defendant. Such sum
will depend on a variety of circumstances and future contingencies, and will, therefore, be difficult of exact ascertainment;
but the damages to be awarded in each case may be approximated by considering the age, health, condition in life, habits of
industry or otherwise, ability to earn money, on the part of the
deceased, including his or her disposition to aid or assist the
plaintiff; not only the kinship or legal relation between the deceased and the plaintiff, but the actual relations between them as
manifested by acts of pecuniary assistance rendered by the deceased to the plaintiff, and also contrary acts may be taken into
268 . SPEISER, RECOVERY
cited as SPEISER].
27
2,
29

FOR WRONGFUL

DEATH

§

1.8 (1966)

[hereinafter

Section 1, [1872] Colo. Sess. Laws 117 (repealed 1877).
Ch. 25, §§ 878-81, [1915] Colo. Sess. Laws 342-44.
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1-3 (Supp. 1969), amending COLO.
STAT. ANN. § 41-1-3 (1963).

REV.

30 Id.

: While the court does not cite Blake, the language is so similiar as to
leave little doubt that Blake was the basis of the court's oninion.
32 Kansas Pac. Ry. v. Miller, 2 Colo. 442 (1874).
33 Id. at 466-67.
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consideration. But it must be borne in mind that the recovery
allowable is in no sense a solatium for the grief of the living occasioned by the death of the relative or friend, however dear.
It is only for the pecuniary loss resulting to the living party entitled to sue resulting from the death of the deceased that the
statute affords compensation. This may34 seem cold and mercenary, but it is unquestionably the law.

A.

II. THE PECUNIARY Loss RULE AND SOCIAL CHANGE
The 19th Century and Limited Liability

The pecuniary loss rule is a product of 19th-century conditions and values. As society changed, the law, in its characteristically tardy manner, failed to keep pace. In the history of
tort law, the period from 1800-1850 is one in which courts consistently restricted liability. During this period, for example,
the courts created the fellow-servant rule, 35 the doctrines of contributory negligence 36 and assumption of the risk, 37 as well as
adopting the duty,38 privity,3 9 and foreseeability 0 limitations to
liability.
Prosser explains the 19th-century trend toward limited
liability when he states: "The explanation

. . .

probably lay in

the highly individualistic viewpoint of the common law courts,
and their desire to encourage industrial undertakings by making
the burden upon them as light as possible. ' 41 Afraid of a great
increase in litigation, 42 which would make members of society
each other's insurers and severely cripple growing industry,
the courts' response was to limit liability. Thus when Justice
Coleridge said: "We must recollect that the Act we are con3

4 Pierce v. Conners, 20 Colo. 178, 182, 37 P. 721, 722 (1874).

This doctrine
has been consistently upheld in Colorado. Denver & R.G.R.R. v. Spencer,
27 Colo. 313, 61 P. 606 (1900); City of Longmont v. Swearingen, 81 Colo.
246, 254 P. 1000 (1927); Lehrer v. Lorenzen, 124 Colo. 17, 233, P.2d 382
(1951); St. Luke's Hosp. Ass'n v. Long, 125 Cclo. 25, 240 P.2d 917 (1953);
McEntyre v. Jones, 128 Colo. 461, 263 P.2d 313 (1953); Rigot v. Conda,
134 Colo. 375, 304 P.2d 629 (1956); Herbertson v. Russell, 150 Colo. 110,
371 P.2d 422 (1952); Kogul v. Sonheim, 150 Colo. 316, 372 P.2d 731
(1962) ; Lewis v. Great W. Distrib. Co., 168 Colo. 424, 451 P.2d 754 (1969).
35 Priestley v. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. 1837).
36 Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809); W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 65 n.1 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER].
37 Priestley v. Fowler, 3 M. & W.

1, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. 1837); PROSSER,
supra note 37, § 69 n.9.
38 Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. N.C. 468, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837);
Landridge v. Levy, 2 M. & W. 519, 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (Ex. 1837);
Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842);
PROSSER, supra note 36, § 53.
3
9 Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
40 Greenland v. Chaplin, 5 Ex. 243, 155 Eng. Rep. 104, (1850); Rigby v.
Hewitt, 5 Ex. 240, 155 Eng. Rep. 103 (1850); PROSSER, supra note 36,
§ 43.
41 PROSSER, supra note 36, § 80.
42 Id. § 4.
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struing applies not only to great Railway Companies but to
little tradesmen who send out a cart and horse in the care of
an apprentice," 43 he was merely handing down one more decision, typical of the period, restricting liability to protect grow44
ing industry.
But the society of the 19th century is not the society of
today. The era of revering the individual has subsided. Through
such policies as medicare, welfare, and mandatory insurance,
we have accepted the principle that to a certain extent in our
society each person is the other's insurer. Nor is industry in
such an infant stage that it needs vigilant protection, even
when it commits a tort. Through the medium of insurance
policies, society has spread the risk to insure that small
merchants are not wiped out by one large tort action. Given
this change in society it is not surprising that in the 20thcentury many of the 19th-century limits on liability have been
erased or modified, and that the modern trend is toward more
extended liability. Yet in Colorado, as in many American jurisdictions, our wrongful death law continues to reflect 19th-century principles.
B.

The Child Cases

The injustice of the pecuniary loss rule is most obvious in
the cases in which the deceased is a small child. Because in
modern society children are a pecuniary burden to their parents,
damages in such cases have frequently been very small. Typical
of such cases is Kogel v. Sonheim. 45 In Kogel the defendants
negligently stored a spot welder, which fell, killing the plaintiff's 4-year-old son. The jury returned a verdict of only $700,
over $600 of which went to pay for the dead child's funeral
expenses. The plaintiff appealed the judgment claiming that:
(1)
the damages awarded by the jury were grossly and manifestly inadequate; and
(2)
in wrongful death actions of this type the measure of damages should not be the net pecuniary loss sustained by the parents but rather the replacement value of the child as measured
care, clothing, support
by the cost of infantile hospitalization and
46
and education up to the child's death.

Nevertheless, the court, restating the pecuniary loss rule, af4

. Blake v. Midland Ry., 18 Q.B. 93, 111-12, 118 Eng. Rep. 35, 42 (1852).
The clcse circle of the English aristocracy which controlled the courts
during this period probably accounts for a greater homogeneity of judicial attitudes in 19th-century England than we have in America today.
For example, Lord Abinger, the judge most famous for his decisions
restricting liability, was Lord Campbell's father-in-law.
45 150 Colo. 316, 372 P.2d 731 (1962).
46 Id. at 318. 372 P.2d at 732.
44
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firmed; the parents of the deceased child were "compensated"
for their loss by only $700.
The application of the pecuniary loss rule to child death
cases has been widely criticized, 47 and for good reason. Nineteenth-century England was highly agricultural. Children on
farms were expected to work, and were a real pecuniary asset
to their parents. Even in the cities, employment of children, at
least among the working class, was common, and a child's in48
come was frequently a benefit to his whole family.
In the modern setting, however, children are rarely a pecuniary benefit to their families. Few minors work before their
teens. Even then work is usually limited to part-time or summer
jobs, the profits of which are generally kept by the child himself and not contributed to the family. Additionally, the costs
of raising children are high, especially if the child goes to college. 49 Thus in a modern setting, the parents' loss is emotional,
not pecuniary; but this very real injury remains virtually incompensable, at least in Colorado.
Recognizing that an old rule of law does not fit modern
times, some courts have rejected the application of the traditional pecuniary loss rule to child death cases. The leading case
is Wycko v. Gnodtke,50 in which the Supreme Court of Michigan
stated:
The interpretation of the requirement of pecuniary loss found in
the early cases, which even today are followed as precedent, re5
flected the mores and legal standards of their times ....

After summarizing the social conditions of the times, the court
continued:
This, then, was the day from which our precedents come, a day
when employment of children of tender years was the accepted
practice and their pecuniary contributions to the family both
substantial and provable. It is not surprising that the courts of
such a society should have read into the statutory words "such
damages as they [the jury] may think proportional to the injury
resulting from such death" not only the requirement of a pecuniary loss, but, moreover, a pecuniary loss established by a
wage benefit-less-costs measure of damages. Other losses were
unreal and untangible and at this time in our legal history the
47 See, e.g., Decof, Damages in Actions for Wrongful Death of Children, 47
NOTRE DAME LAW. 197 (1971); Johnson, Wrongful Death and Intellectual
Dishonesty, 16 S.D.L. REv. 36 (1971); Comment, Damages for the
Wrongful Death of Children, 22 U. CH. L. REV. 538 (1955).
48 Comment, supra note 47, at 545-46.
49 Id. at 546-47.
50 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960). Wycko has since been severely
limited by Breckon v. Franklin Fuel Co., 383 Mich. 251, 174 N.W.2d 836
(1970). Neverthless, Wycko remains one of he best reasoned cases
in this area, regardless of the scope of its authority in Michigan.
51 361 Mich. at 334, 105 N.W.2d at 120.
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courts would have no truck with what Chief Baron Pollock
termed . . "imaginary losses." Less meant only money loss, and
money loss from the death of a child meant only his lost wages.
All else was imaginary. The only reality was the King's
52
shilling.
In short, the Wycko court said that the object of damages is,
as far as possible, to make the wronged party whole. As time
has gone by, and our economic system has changed, there has
come a realization that lost earnings are simply a part of
the damage suffered by the parents of a dead child.
Wycko deals with the measure of damages for actions in
which the decedent is a child. Perhaps the injustice of the
present rule of damages shows itself most strongly in child death
cases, but the logic of a broader rule of damages applies equally
well to cases in which adults have been the victims. A middleaged person may be totally dependent on his spouse emotionally, but not financially. Yet if that spouse is killed wrongfully,
the survivor may collect almost no damages at all. A small
child whose nonworking mother is killed certainly suffers a
severe injury. Yet unless that child can show a pecuniary loss,
his injury is incompensable. 53
III.

CIRCUMVENTING THE RuLE

The Colorado Supreme Court has long recognized the
inequity of the pecuniary loss rule. After stating the general
rule, the court in Pierce v. Conners5 4 added: "This may seem
cold and mercenary, but it is unquestionably the law."5 5 In
response to this, two lines of cases have developed in Colorado.
The first, which includes Pierce, Kogel v. Sonheim,56 and
Herbertson v. Russell57 has taken the traditional narrow view
of pecuniary damages. A second line of cases beginning with
Kansas Pacific Railway Co. v. Lunden,58 gives lip service to
the pecuniary loss rule, and then allows a broader rule of damages. In Lunden the court said:
As a matter of sentiment, life has no pecuniary value, but considered with reference to the relations of deceased with others,
Id. at 336, 105 N.W.2d at 121. For similar cases see Fussner v. Andert,
261 Minn. 347, 113 N.W.2d 355 (1962): Lockhart v. Besel, 17 Wash. Dec.
2d 109, 426 P.2d 605 (1967).
53 For an analysis of the rule of damages in such cases see Comment, The
Unemployed Housewife-Mother: Fair Appraisal of Economic Loss in a
Wrongful Death Action, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 205 (1971).
54 Pierce v. Conners, 20 Colo. 178, 37 P. 721 (1894).
5 Id. at 182, 37 P. at 722.
56 Kogul v. Sonheim, 150 Colo. 316, 372 P.2d 731 (1962).
57 150 Colo. 110, 371 P.2d 422 (1962).
58 3 Colo. 94 (1876).
52
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it is capable of such estimate. In this sense a parent is entitled
to the services of children during their minority, and to support
and maintenance from them in his declining years; a husband is
entitled to the assistance of his wife in the affairs of life, and a
wife is entitled to support from her husband; children may demand nurture and education from parents, and all these services
may be compensated in some sort and degree by money. It is in
this sense, with reference to the probable benefits that would
have been derived by survivors from the life of the deceasd, if he
had lived, that the phrase should be understood in the law, for
59
otherwise all will be left to the discretion of the jury.

In Southern Colo. Power Co. v. Pestance6 the court allowed
a recovery of $5,000 although there was no evidence that the
deceased son had ever contributed any pecuniary benefit to his
parents' household, or ever would. The court said:
Are the damages excessive? We think not. The son was a
steady, hard-working, healthy, active, intelligent college boy,
working to earn money to finish his college course. His parents
were between fifty and sixty years old. Without including any
solatium, the jury might well have found that the probable pecuniary loss to these parents was five thousand dollars. The son
was bound by law to support them in their old age, and his physique, character and conduct, as shown by the evidence, proves
his ability and willingness to do so. It is never possible in such
cases to prove the damages with any approximation to certainty.
The jury must estimate them as best they can be reasonable
probabilities, but that is no reason for denying them altogether.
... The boy might have turned out an invalid and not supported
his parents at all, or a millionaire and supported them in luxury;
the probability is between the two.61

Similarly in Longmont v. Swearingen62 the court approved
a verdict of $3,500 for the wrongful death of a minor who was
not contributing financially to the household. In St. Lukes Hospital Association v. Long6 3 the defendant hospital had placed a
3-year-old boy in an adult bed from which he took a fatal fall.
The jury returned a verdict of $5,000. In affirming the court

cited Lunden and said:
The objection is based solely upon the ground that there was no
evidence in its support other than mortuary and cemetery bills.
There was testimony that the boy was in good health and the
court sustained objection of defendant to further evidence along
that line. It is impossible to establish with any definiteness or
certainty the future earning ability of a three-year-old boy or
his future generosity toward his parents. To hold that no recovery could be had in the absence of such showing would be
in effect to abolish the right to recovery by parents of young
59 Id. at 102-03.

60 80 Colo. 375, 251 P. 224 (1926).
61 Id. at 379, 224 P. at 226.
62 81 Colo. 246, 254 P. 1000 (1927).
63 125 Colo. 25, 240 P.2d 917 (1952).
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children and such was not, we think, the legislative intent in the
64
enactment of the statute.

St. Lukes was approved in McEntyre v. Jones65 a case in
which the court affirmed a judgment of $7,500, awarded the
parents of a 13-year-old girl even though there was no evidence
to indicate that the parents had suffered any actual pecuniary
loss. Finally, in Dawkins v. Chavez66 the court upheld an award
of $10,000 to the parents of a 9-year-old child who had been
killed while crossing a street. Again, there was no evidence to
indicate that the parents had suffered any pecuniary loss.
The two lines of cases are irreconcilable. While indicating
that Colorado follows a pecuniary loss rule, in those cases where
juries have failed to follow the trial court's instructions, the
supreme court has frequently refused to reverse. One can only
speculate as to why the supreme court has acted this way. However, one answer may be that the court has recognized the
injustice of its own rule, and rather than overturn it, has occasionally merely refused to follow it. If both courts and juries
were consistent in granting more liberal damages than the traditional pecuniary loss rule would dictate, there might be little
problem. Since courts and juries have not been consistent, it
is purely fortuitous as to whether a plaintiff will receive a
large or small amount of compensation.
IV.

SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM

Critics of the pecuniary loss rule have proposed different
solutions to the problem. The most common of these is to add
some flexible item of damages so that jurors may in fact bring
back the verdict they deem to be "fair and just." At least 14
states, in adopting a more liberal rule,67 have included at least
one item of damages which when put in the hands of a jury
becomes extremely flexible. While different states have different terms for such flexible items, they can roughly be
divided into three categories: (1) mental anguish, grief and sor-
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Id. at 33, 240 P.2d at 922.

65 128 Colo. 461, 263 P.2d 313 (1953).
66 132 Colo. 61, 285 P.2d 821 (1955).
67

These states include Ariz., Cal., Fla., Idaho, Minn., Miss., Mont., Pa., S.C.,
Tex., Utah, Wash., W. Va., and probably Mich. For a complete state-bystate analysis, see SPEIsER, supra note 26, § 3:1 nn.6, 16.
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row, solatium; 68 (2) loss of society, companionship and consortium;6 9 (3) loss of care, guidance, and support.7 0
The manner in which these states have adopted a broadened
rule of damages is worthy of note. In only one state, West Virginia, does the local wrongful death statute specifically provide
for nonpecuniary damages. 71 Seven states have judicially abandoned the pecuniary loss rule. 72 The remaining seven states
have retained a pecuniary loss rule, but have a broader definition of pecuniary loss than does Colorado. 73 Thus it has been
held in California that:
Althcugh damages must be measured by pecuniary loss to the
plaintiffs, in fixing such loss the trier of facts is not limited to
proof of loss in dollars and cents, but may properly consider
pecuniary value of such non-economic interests of a family as
74
toss of comfort, society and protection.

Consequently, it would be possible for Colorado to broaden
its present rule of damages without abandoning its long-standing commitment to the pecuniary loss rule.
Unfortunately, none of these solutions has been seriously
considered in Colorado. Rather, the path of reform has been
muddled by a series of constitutional arguments which have
been rejected by the Colorado Supreme Court. The leading
proponent of such an approach was Justice Albert Franz.
68 See, e.g., Sanders v. Green, 208 F. Supp. 873 (E.D.S.C. 1962); City of

Tuscon v. Wondergem, 105 Ariz. 429, 466 P.2d 383 (1970); Lynch v.
Alexander, 242 S.C. 208, 130 S.E.2d 563 (1963); Wolfe v. Lockhart, 195
Va. 479, 78 S.E.2d 654 (1953); Stamper v. Bannister, 146 W. Va. 100, 118
S.E.2d 313 (1961).
69 Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 113 N.W.2d 355 (1962); Delta Chevrolet
Co. v. Wald, 211 Miss. 256, 51 So. 2d 443 (1951); Mize v. Rocky Mt. Bell
Tel. Co., 38 Mont. 521, 100 P. 971 (1909); Spangler v. Helm's N.Y.-Pittsburgh Motor Express, 396 Pa. 482, 153 A.2d 490 (1959); Lynch v. Alexander, 242 S.C. 208, 130 S.E.2d 563 (1963); Van Cleave v. Lynch, 109
Utah 149, 166 P.2d 244 (1946); Burbidge v. Utah Light & Traction Co.,
57 Utah 566, 196 P. 556 (1921). See, e.g., Boies v. Cole, 99 Ariz. 198, 407
P.2d 917 (1965); Kemp v. Pinal County, 8 Ariz. App. 41, 442 P.2d 864
(1968); Hale v. San Bernadino Valley Traction Co., 156 Cal. 713, 106
P. 83 (1909); Tyson v. Romey, 88 Cal. App. 2d 752, 199 P.2d 721 (1948);
Holder v. Key Sys., 88 Cal. App. 2d 925, 200 P.2d 98 (1948); Lithgow v.
Hamilton, 69 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 1954); Hepp v. Ader, 64 Idaho 240, 130
P.2d 859 (1942); Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118
(1960).
70 See, e.g., Platis v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 254 (D. Utah 1968); Gilmore v. Los Angeles Ry., 211 Cal. 192, 295 P. 41 (1930); Duncan v.
Smith, 376 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); David v. North Coast
Transp. Co., 160 Wash. 576, 295 P. 921 (1931); Aronson v. City of Everett,
136 Wash. 312, 239 P. 1011 (1925).
71
72

SPEISER, supra note 26 app. A.
Ariz., Fla., Idaho, Miss., S.C., Va., and Wash. See SPEIER, supra note 26,

§ 3:1 n.6, 16.
73 Cal., Mich., Minn., Mont., Pa., Tex., and Utah. See SPEISER, supra note 26,

§ 3:1 nn.6, 16.

74 Holder v. Key Sys., 88 Cal. App. 2d 925, 940, 200 P.2d 98, 106 (1948).
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In both his dissent in Kogel v. Sonheim 75 and his concurrence in Herbertson v. Russell7 6 Justice Franz attempted to do
away with the duplicity involved in the Colorado Supreme
Court's treatment of wrongful death actions. Franz's disagreement with the majority opinion in these cases was based on his
interpretation of the Colorado Bill of Rights. In particular, he
felt that the following sections made imperative a broader rule
of damages in wrongful death actions:
Section 3. Inalienable rights-All persons have certain natural, essential and inalienable rights, among which may be
reckoned the rights of enjoying and defending their lives and

liberties

....

77

Section 6. Equality of justice- [there shall be] a speedy
remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character .... 78

Section 25. Due process of law- No person shall be deprived
79
of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
Examination of each of these sections, however, reveals the
weakness of Franz's argument. In attempting to apply sections
3 and 25, Franz fails to take into consideration who the plaintiff is. The Colorado wrongful death statute does not transfer
an old cause of action to new plaintiffs, but creates an entirely
new cause of action by which the beneficiaries may be compensated for their own injuries.80 Consequently, it is the rights of
the survivors, not of the decedent which must be infringed
upon before the constitutional protections can mandate a
broader rule of damages. First, it is clear that neither the
survivors' lives nor liberty are at issue; the survivors are both
alive and free regardless of what rule of damages is applied.
Second, the right to be compensated for lost property is similarly irrelevant, for property losses are already covered under
the present pecuniary loss rule. It is rather the more intangible losses - mental anguish, companionship, solatium- which
are not yet compensable in Colorado. Third, to argue that section 6 is grounds for a broader rule of damages is circular. This
section says, in essence, that every legal injury must be compensated. What Blake and Pierce hold is that absent a statute,
wrongful death is not a legal injury. Thus if judicial modifica75 Kogul v. Sonheim, 150 Colo. 316, 323-25, 372 P.2d 731, 735-36 (1962).
7GHerbertson v. Russell, 150 Colo. 110, 118-26, 371 P.2d 422, 427-31 (1962).
7T COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 3.
78 Id. § 6.
79 Id. § 25.
80 Moffatt v. Tenney, 17 Colo. 189, 30 P. 348 (1892); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-1-3 (Supp. 1969), amending COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1-3 (1963)
states that damages are to be awarded "with reference to the necessary
injury resulting from such death, to the surviving parties ....
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tion of the pecuniary loss rule is desired, it must be done
through statutory construction not constitutional interpretation.
Given the weakness of his arguments, it is not surprising
that Justice Franz was unable to persuade his colleagues to
take a more enlightened view of the pecuniary loss rule. It is,
nonetheless, unfortunate. The real question is not a constitutional one; it is how best to tailor the law of torts to a modern,
industrial setting.
The basic premise of tort law is that wrongful injuries
should be compensable. It is, therefore, of paramount importance
that rules of damages approach, as closely as possible, the injury suffered. The language of the present Colorado wrongful
death statute is broad enough to allow just compensation; only
judicial fiat has interfered.
CONCLUSION

We have seen that the pecuniary loss rule is based on insecure underpinnings. The rule in Baker v. Bolton was probably ill-advised when it was handed down, for it failed to recognize that the doctrine of merger was no longer applicable.
Lord Campbell's Act was a step in the right direction, but the
strict construction it was given in Blake v. Midland Railway
reflected the court's 19th-century concern over extended tort
liability. Colorado adopted the rule in Blake and has consistently
upheld it despite the change in social conditions which has
taken place since Blake became law. Applying the pecuniary
loss rule to child death cases makes clear its archaic character,
but analytically there is no reason why any modification in the
case of children should not apply to adults as well. The Colorado court is not bound; many other jurisdictions have judicially
expanded or abandoned the pecuniary loss rule.
The real point of the underlying tort theory is that wrongdoers should compensate the people they injure. In a 19thcentury setting it may have made sense to limit liabiilty, but
in a modern society there is no reason why injured parties
should not be compensated. While mere money can never fully
compensate the loss of a loved one, it is a beginning, and is
certainly more complete compensation than nothing at all.
Given these social realities, it is time that Colorado changed its
rule of damages by adding some flexible item such as loss of
companionship. If the supreme court fails to act, then the legislature should modify the present wrongful death statute. Whatever the source, there should be quick and immediate action,
for as the court in Wycko pointed out, "[tihat this barbarous
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concept of pecuniary loss .
is a reproach to justice."'"
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should control our decisions today
David K. Rees
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Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 337, 105 N.W.2d 118, 121 (1960).

